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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME T AX-REuo1ous ORDER NoT EXEMPT FROM 
SUPPLEMENT U TAX AS A CHURCH-Plaintiff, a non-profit, membership 
corporation consists of members of the Christian Brothers Order,1 and was 
established to furnish religious and secular education to youth. The 
Catholic Church considers religious instruction to be the performance of a 
church function, and property of the Christian Brothers Order is church 
property according to Roman Catholic canon law. During the taxable 
years in question plaintiff owned and operated a novitiate, Catholic schools, 
homes for the Brothers, and a winery and distillery.2 Plaintiff was assessed 
and paid $489,800.83 as a Supplement U tax on its unrelated business 
income realized from the winery and distillery operation. Plaintiff claimed 
that it was exempt from the tax as a "church"3 since, under the regulations 
governing section !Hl of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,4 a religious 
order qualifies as a church for the purposes of the exemption if it is an 
integral part of a church and engaged in carrying out church functions. 
In a refund proceeding before the district court, held, judgment for 
defendant. The term "church .. as used in section 511 does not include 
1 The San Francisco Province of the Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools, 
a Religious Institute of Pontifical Right of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, founded 
in 1680 by St. Jean Baptiste de la Salle and established by a papal bull issued by Pope 
Benedict XIII in 1725. 
2 The latter activity was carried out principally by laymen. 
s INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 511 (a) (2) • A tax is imposed on the unrelated business 
income of tax-exempt organizations "other than a church •••. " 
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.511-2 (a) (3) (ii) (1958). "The term 'church' includes a religious 
order ••• if • • • (a) it is an integral part of a church, and (b) is engaged in carrying 
out the functions of a church." The Government argued that plaintiff did not qualify 
as a church under the regulation. However, if it did so qualify, the Government would 
have been in the unusual position of attacking the validity of its own regulation, 
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religious orders, and the treasury regulation to the contrary is invalid. De 
La Salle Institute v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961). 
The federal government has long adhered to a policy of indirectly 
subsidizing certain private organizations engaged in eleemosynary activities.5 
Congress has given such organizations special recognition by exempting 
them from the federal income taxes6 and by encouraging gifts to them 
through allowing a deduction of the amounts contributed, within specified 
limits, from the taxable gross income of the donor.7 Realizing that this tax 
exemption privilege was being used to avoid taxes as well as to promote 
what it felt to be worthwhile activities, Congress enacted legislation levying 
a tax-the Supplement U tax-on the unrelated business income of certain 
tax-exempt organizations.8 This tax was enacted to prevent the unfair 
competition which had resulted when tax-exempt organizations entered 
into commercial activities in competition with private enterprise,9 but it did 
not impair the tax-exempt status which these organizations enjoyed in 
regard to their eleemosynary activities. Congress merely intended to assess 
a tax against the unrelated business income of these organizations which, in 
all fairness to their business competitors, should properly be Ievied.10 
Churches and associations or conventions of churches were expressly 
excluded from the Supplement U tax.11 However, Congress at the time of 
5 Wolkstein, Criteria for Tax Exemption as a Religious, Educational, or Philanthropic 
Organization, 89 J. Accountancy 404 (1950). The theory is "that the government is 
compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from the financial burden which would 
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds and by the benefits 
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare." H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 
3d Sess. 19, 20 (1938) • 
6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501. Provisions exempting religious, charitable, and 
educational organizations have been a part of our tax laws since the Act of Aug. 27, 1894, 
ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556. 
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170. 
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 421 added by ch. 521, 65 Stat. 452 (1951) [now INT. REv. 
CoDE OF 1954, § 511). The tax avoidance problem resulted largely from the Supreme 
Court's view that the destination rather than the source of the income determined whether 
or not an organization was tax-exempt. For example, in the principal case, although the 
source of plaintiff's income was its winery and distillery, its destination was plaintiff's 
religious activities. Thus, the plaintiff would ostensibly maintain a tax-exempt status. 
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578 (1924). For cases applying 
this test, see, e.g., Gymnastic Ass'n v. Higgins, 147 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Roches Beach 
v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938). But cf. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Campbell, 
181 F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1950); Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 922 (1950). The 
Universal and Mueller cases immediately preceded the enactment of the Supplement U tax 
and called Congress' attention to the abuse of the tax exemption privilege. The Mueller 
case was highly publicized. New York University Law School had purchased a controlling 
interest in the Mueller Macaroni Co. and was using the profits for the exclusive benefit 
of the Law School. In that instance the Tax Court held the income taxable, limiting 
severely the ultimate destination test of Sagrada. 
9 H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36, 37 (1950) • 
10 Ibid. 
11 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 511. 
666 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
the enactment of the statute clearly stated that religious organizations, 
including religious orders, were within the purview of the tax.12 The 
exclusion of churches from the Supplement U tax was re-enacted in the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 without substantial change.13 Had the 
impact of that section truly remained unchanged there could be no question 
that plaintiff in the principal case would have fallen within the category of 
organizations at which the Supplement U tax was directed. But, in 1954, 
during the re-enactment of section 170,14 dealing with deductions for 
charitable contributions to exempt institutions, significant discussions 
conducted during the Senate Finance Committee hearings induced the 
Treasury Department to issue a new regulation redefining the word 
"church" as used in section 511.15 The House Bill on charitable deductions 
had granted an extra ten percent deduction to taxpayers making contri-
butions to "a church, a convention, or association of churches, or a religious 
order."16 Notwithstanding the existing Treasury Regulation to the 
contrary,17 the Committee accepted the premise of a representative of the 
Catholic Church that the term "church," as then appearing in section 511, 
included religious orders, and that explicit reference to religious orders 
in section 170 would necessarily imply a more restricted meaning of the 
word "church" in the former section.18 The Committee, induced by the 
desire for the uniform interpretation of the phrase, "a church, a convention 
or association of churches," as it would appear in both sections 170 and 511, 
deleted the words "or a religious order" from the bill as originally drafted.19 
This action prompted the Treasury to issue the present regulation20 which 
broadened the pre-1954 definition of "churches" to include religious orders 
if (a) they were an integral part of a church, and (b) they performed a 
church function. Since the Christian Brothers Order was established by 
papal bull to teach religion, which the Catholic Church considers an 
essential church function,21 plaintiff in the principal case would appear 
to meet the qualifications required by the r.egulation in order to obtain 
12 H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1950) • 
13 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. Al70 (1954); [1954] 3 U.S. CODE CONG. &: 
Ao. NEWS 4304. 
14 !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170. 
15 Treas. Reg. § 1.511-2 (a) (3) (1958). The same definition is applied to § 170. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.170-2 (b) (2) (1958). 
16 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1954); [1954] 3 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &: 
Ao. NEWS 4660-61. 
17 Treas. Reg. § 39-421 (2) (a) (3) (1950). 
1s Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1029 (1954) . 
19 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1954); [1954] 3 U.S. CODE CONG. &: 
Ao. NEWS 4660-61. 
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.511-2 (a) (3) (1958). 
21 See Garland &: Cahill, The Concept of Church in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 
1 CAmouc LAw. 27 (1955), for the Catholic view of what constitutes a church for tax 
exemption purposes. 
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the claimed exemption of its unrelated business income.22 The validity 
of the Treasury regulation was therefore brought squarely into issue. 
The court in the principal case was faced with a choice between two 
conflicting declarations of congressional intent. The declared intent of the 
Senate Finance Committee, albeit erroneously founded, was to treat 
religious orders as churches. On the other hand, the effect of re-enacting 
section 511 without substantial change was to continue to distinguish 
between churches and their respective religious orders. In resolving this 
conflict the court adopted the latter alternative. The regulation promul-
gated under the predecessor to section 51123 was construed to contain the 
intended meaning of the word "church."24 By re-enacting that section 
without substantial change Congress was held to have intended to in-
corporate that definition into the 1954 Code. This judicial approach seems 
consistent with the overall purpose sought to be accomplished by Congress 
when the Supplement U tax was enacted. Plaintiff unquestionably is a 
corporation organized and operated for religious and educational purposes 
and in all respects qualifies for a tax exemption.25 However, the manu-
f,acture and distribution of plaintiff's wine and brandy is the regular 
conduct of a trade or business substantially unrelated to the purpose 
constituting the basis for its exemption.26 These business activities are 
illustrative of the very activity Congress sought to render taxable through 
passage of the Supplement U tax-the entry of otherwise tax-exempt 
organizations into unrelated businesses while using their preferred tax 
status to put their private counterparts at a competitive disadvantage. Had 
the court in the principal case allowed plaintiff to be excluded from the 
Supplement U tax it would have substantially narrowed the effect of that 
provision. 
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.511-2 (a) (3) (1958), states: "A religious order or organization shall 
be considered to be engaged in carrying out the functions of a church if its duties include 
the ministration of sacerdotal functions and the conduct of religious worship." In the 
principal case the court believed the functions of the order were educational and religious, 
not sacerdotal. Thus it was concluded that even under the regulation the order could 
not qualify as a "church." However, in the view of the Catholic Church the ministration 
of sacerdotal functions are not the sole function of a church. The teaching of religion is 
considered an important church function. So, unless the regulation is read to mean that 
only the ministration of sacerdotal functions enable an order to qualify as a "church," 
the plaintiff would come within the definition of the regulation. 
23 Treas. Reg. § 39.421 (2) (a) (3) (1950) • 
24 The committee reports and discussion on the floor of the House at the time of the 
original enactment substantiate this premise. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 108 
(1950). See 96 CoNG. REc. 9367-68 (1950), for discussion on plaintiff's status under the 
Supplement U tax. The representative from plaintiff's district questioned the sponsor 
of the bill. The resolution of the question seemed to depend on whether or not the 
activity was unrelated, it being felt that if it were plaintiff would be taxed. 
25 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 501 (c) (3) • 
26 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 512, 513 define unrelated trade or business and unrelated 
business income. 
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Under the court's approach it would seem that the exclusion from 
taxation of the unrelated business activities of a church, as distinguished 
from a religious order, is unaffected. This is apparently consistent with the 
intent of Congress although no reason appears on record for the exclusion 
of churches from the Supplement U tax. It can only be surmised that it 
resulted from a compromise and from the knowledge that generally churches 
do not carry on any substantial unrelated business activities. Nevertheless, 
if plaintiff's winery and distillery were now turned over to an affiliated 
church, the income therefrom would escape tax under the exemption, 
although the same laymen who operated the business when controlled by 
plaintiff were to continue its operation. Yet, there seems to be no 
justification for not taxing any income realized if the purpose of the Supple-
ment U tax was in fact to prevent unfair col!lpetition. Indeed, the position 
of the church would be analogous to that of New York University Law 
School in operating Mueller's Macaroni Co.21-the case that crystallized 
the abuse of the tax exemption privilege and led to the passage of the 
Supplement U tax.28 Unless Congress has a specific reason for excluding 
churches from taxation of their unrelated business income, other than those 
suggested, reconsideration of the exclusion granted churches in section 511 
seems appropriate to prevent the reoccurrence of activities considered 
undesirable in 1954. 
Alan Rothenberg 
21 Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 922 (1950) • See note 8 supra. 
28 See 96 CoNG. RE<:. 9366 (1950) • Acting Secretary of the Treasury Lynch, while 
speaking on the House floor, referred to the NYU-Mueller situation. He concluded: "I 
can see no reason in justice to permit an educational institution to operate a spaghetti 
factory, a department store or any other business under the cloak of tax exemption, while 
competitors in the same business are presently subject to a ••• tax •.•. " By the same 
reasoning it is submitted that there is "no reason in justice" for allowing a church to 
operate a winery and distillery without tax consequences. 
